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The purpose of this research was to prove that solving a legal problem needed an interdisciplinary 
approach, more than merely pure law. It relates to the working culture of law, inter-subjective 
understanding and reform willingness. The research was done based on descriptive and qualitative 
method. It included content analyses of the use and misuse concept of regulation, its effect in actual 
practice and cultural barrier of law enforcement. The finding of this research proved that law 
enforcement was not like copying a paper. It related closely to the tradition, usage and custom of people. 
Transforming society only by introducing new regulation and state institution without cultural 
restoration ended in failure. Thus, the conclusion was the establishment of Judicial Commission in 
Indonesia, aimed at transforming the Supreme Court, to be more independent, impartial and accountable 
by supervising the ethical behaviour of the judge. But Judicial Commission is hampered by many 
difficulties legally and institutionally. Judicial Commission could not work and achieve its goal to bring 
about Supreme Court more transparent, not only because of legal obstacles but also cultural impunity.  
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Abstrak 
Penelitian ini bertujuan untuk membuktikan bahwa penyelesaian suatu masalah hukum memerlukan 
pendekatan interdisipliner, lebih dari sekedar ilmu hukum murni. Ini berkaitan dengan budaya kerja 
hukum, pemahaman inter-subjektif dan kemauan reformasi. Penelitian ini dilakukan dengan metode 
deskriptif kualitatif. Ini mencakup analisis konten mengenai penggunaan dan penyalahgunaan konsep 
regulasi, dampaknya pada praktik nyata serta hambatan budaya penegakan hukum. Temuan penelitian 
ini membuktikan bahwa penegakan hukum tidak seperti menyalin tulisan. Penegakan hukum memiliki 
hubungan erat dengan tradisi, dan adat istiadat masyarakat. Mengubah masyarakat dengan hanya 
memperkenalkan regulasi baru dan  lembaga negara tanpa restorasi budaya akan berakhir dengan 
kegagalan. Dengan demikian, dapat disimpulkan bahwa pembentukan Komisi Yudisial (KY) di Indonesia 
bertujuan untuk membuat Mahkamah Agung (MA) menjadi lebih independen, imparsial, dan akuntabel 
dengan mengawasi perilaku etis hakim. Namun dalam praktiknya KY menghadapi banyak hambatan 
secara hukum dan kelembagaan. KY tidak dapat bekerja dan mencapai tujuannya untuk mewujudkan 
MA yang lebih transparan disebabkan oleh tidak hanya hambatan legal tapi juga impunitas budaya. 
Kata kunci: budaya; Komisi Yudisial; Mahkamah Agung; paradoks hukum 
الملخص 
كان الغرض من هذا البحث إثباتا أن حل مشكلة قانونية يحتاج إلى نهج متعدد التخصصات، أكثر من مجرد قانون خالص. و 
المنهج الوصفي والنوعي. ذلك يتعلق بثقافة العمل في القانون، والتفاهم الذاتي، واالستعداد لإلصالح. و يتم البحث على أساس 
ويتضمن تحليالت محتوى لمفهوم االستخدام وسوء االستخدام للتنظيم وتأثيره في الممارسة الحقيقية والحاجز الثقافي إلنفاذ 
الناس واستخدامهم  بتقاليد  يرتبط ارتباًطا وثيقًا  بل  القانون ليس مثل نسخ ورقة،  إنفاذ  البحث فهي  نتيجة هذا  القانون. و أما 
داتهم. إن تحويل المجتمع فقط من خالل إدخال نظام جديد وإنشاء مؤسسة حكومية دون استعادة الثقافة سينتهي بالفشل. وعا
اللجنة القضائية تهدف إلى تحويل المحكمة  KY) Komisi Yudisial) وبالتالي، فإن االستنتاج هو إنشاء  التي  في إندونيسيا 
ر استقاللية وحيادية ومساءلة من خالل اإلشراف على السلوك األخالقي ، لتصبح أكث (Mahkamah Agung  (MAالعليا
العمل وتحقيق  KY تواجه العديد من الصعوبات القانونية والمؤسسية. و ال تستطيع KY للقاضي. ولكن من الناحية العملية  فإن
.ن أيًضا بسبب اإلفالت من العقاب الثقافيهدفها المتمثل في تحقيق ماجستير أكثر شفافية، ليس فقط بسبب العقبات القانونية ولك
الكلمات الرئيسية: الثقافة؛ الهيئة القضائية؛ المحكمة العليا؛ التناقض القانوني 
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INTRODUCTION 
In the study of jurisprudence, the substance of law comprises a set of legal norms, whether 
they are written legal norms, commonly known as legislation or unwritten rules. Included in this 
substance is a product of the legal system itself, such as jurisprudence or decisions with a variety 
of variants and its derivatives or regulations adopted by the agents of the law when they apply 
the law and its relations. When a trader agrees with one another, for example, or when a 
president signs a memorandum of cooperation or other important decisions, then he bases all of 
it on the related regulations in trade, government, etc. In short, all of the rules are commonly 
referred to as a legal substance (Cotterrell, 2017a; Friedman, 1977; Priban, 2017).   
The legal structure is also closely related to the law enforcement. It is directly related to the 
organization or bureaucracy that sustains the enforcement or – borrowing Hans Kelsen’s phrase 
– that is to realize its (Konkretisierung) substance of law to achieve an aspired justice (Kelsen,
1979). This structure is usually known as the "administration of justice". Talking about the
structure of administrative law or the law to achieve this justice cannot be separated by a
discussion of the judicial system itself, together with supporting infrastructure closely associated
with it. Usually, in a country revived by a modern conception of modern state administration or
the welfare state, the supporting infrastructure of the legal structure (criminal) is the police
(investigator), prosecutor, the court (the judge), lawyer (lawyers/defenders) and prison
(rehabilitator) (Dias, 1976; Raz, 1973).
Legal culture can be described as the "software" of substance and structure of the law itself. 
It is closely associated with the culture of the society, the ideal expectation of some form of 
intended community, values and beliefs that are behind the visible legal tradition. Including the 
legal culture is also understanding, perception, acceptance attitude and practice acceptance, 
awareness, emotion or obedience, and attitudes towards governance (legal structure) and the law 
itself (the substance of the law) (Chambliss & Seidman, 1971; Radbruch, 1961). 
The ideal of legal change will fail if it is only related to changes in the content or legal 
structure, but it has to touch on all three elements (content, structure and legal culture) 
simultaneously. The change in legislative texts (legal content) is not alter the work mechanism 
and administration of legal institutions (legal structure), let alone to change the perception or 
legal understanding of society (legal culture). It occurs often, a set of texts of legislation and 
regulations that have contained the ideal normative values that have been completed and put 
into effect, but because of the institutional apparatus and unprofessional personnel, the 
legislation stops to be in effect (Algra, N., 1981). 
During the New Order era, thoughts on Trias Politica were well known. But in the practical 
level, the separation of powers based on the Trias Politica had not gone as expected. The New 
Order regime was fully controlled and dominated by the executive line, while the legislative and 
judicial powers operated as if they were only legal accessories. Thirty years more such 
governance practices had proceeded, to where the correction for these deviations had surfaced 
and reached its peak in 1998 with the coming of the era known as the reform era. 
One product of the reform era is the birth of the Assembly Decree of The People's 
Consultative Assembly (Ketetapan Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat/TAP MPR) which 
contains the principle of development reform in rescuing and normalizing national life as a state 
policy (TAP MPR No X / MPR / 1998). It stresses the need for a cut and clear separation 
between the three institutions of power (executive, legislative and judiciary), so that each 
function can be ideal and give birth to proper governance practices. For this purpose, it is 
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deemed necessary to amend the Constitution (Undang Undang Dasar) and related regulatory 
changes. Thus, Judicial Commission was born. Its primary task is to protect the independence, 
impartiality and accountability of The Supreme Court and judiciary by supervising the dignity 
and noble character and behaviour of judges.  
In practical level, the ideal purpose of establishing Judicial Commission has some socio-
cultural obstacles. Therefore, this article is written in order to answer the following research 
questions: how is the inter-cultural relation between law, politics and tradition of good 
governance; what are the cultural barriers of Judicial Commission in supervising Supreme 
Court? why Supreme Court has a socio-legal impunity, that it can easily avoid Judicial 
Commission’s control?; what should be done to apply “check and balanced” system by 
employing Judicial Commission to be a sparring partner of Supreme Court in order to erase 
legal paradox? 
METHOD 
The research is done based on descriptive and qualitative approach. It includes content 
analyses of the concept of regulation, its effect in actual practice and cultural barrier of law 
enforcement. It begins by describing the tradition of good and bad governance, the interrelation 
of culture and law enforcement, and the use and misuse of law. The following step is the 
elaboration of job and task of Supreme Court and Judicial Commission in accordance to the rule 
of law. After describing the task, the writing shows detailed daily tension of Supreme Court and 
Judicial Commission in carrying their duties, so that the ‘forced’ cultural transplantation and 
legal paradox is clearly illustrated. The explorations end with some academic options of 
solutions.  
The end of this research will show that tension and conflict between Judicial Commission 
and Supreme Court have to be resolved. Judicial Commission has its own duties that must be 
respected. By referring to theories of Max Weber, there are four elements of rational law: 
rational substance, rational procedure, irrational substance, irrational procedure. If the tension 
and conflict cannot be resolved rationally, the two institutions cannot be called as rational 
products. Therefore, they may be labelled as institutions with legal and cultural paradox. The 
rational approach will lead the cultural transplantation of a legal system towards sound 
institutional interrelation. Some ideas for solving rationally are the end points of the article. 
FINDINGS AND DISCUSSION 
Judicial Commission as a Solution: The Interrelation of Law, Politics and Corruption 
Among the worst social disease, corruption in Indonesia is that attacking its legal structure 
(police, prosecutors, courts). National Survey on corruption conducted by the Partnership for 
Governance Reform in Indonesia, in 2002, showed how bad the law enforcers were. A survey 
that involved 650 respondents of civil servants, 400 private employees, and 1,250 citizens 
concluded that the judicial bodies and the judiciary were regarded as the most corrupt public 
institutions. According to the survey, judges and prosecutors, individually and institutionally, 
were considered the most corrupt in Indonesia. They were slightly better than the traffic police 
and custom (Tim Penyusun, 2005). The case is not decreasing even until today. 
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Daniel Kaufmann, an observer of the law and legal institutions in developing countries, in a 
survey of bureaucratic and judicial bribery also stated that bribery in the judicial system in 
Indonesia was the highest when compared to countries prominently controlled by agents and 
narcotics mafia such as Colombia, Venezuela or the former communist states of Ukraine and 
Russia or semi-dictatorial countries such as Egypt and Jordan (Tim Penyusun, 2005).         
On the corruption in the judiciary or commonly known as the legal mafia, it has plagued the 
judicial process from upstream to downstream, at all stages, starting from the inquiry and 
investigation by police in a criminal case, investigation, filing and transfer of cases to the court 
by prosecutor to the case and court sessions and judge’s verdict in the court. Even until after the 
verdict is given to the defendant/suspect that he is convicted, there is still a chance to make a 
transaction of legal execution with the prosecution or prison authorities (Zakiyah & dkk, 2003). 
Briefly, in order that prosecutors and judges can also be designed under the plot, then a 
lawyer strengthens and fully supports these actions. The chronology and sequence of cases from 
the early start have been prepared by the police to aim the target with such technical 
modifications and technicalities in the existing legal formal and material. Even it is not 
impossible for a real defendant / suspect, in the process of investigation by the police, can be set 
free as long as he understands the case 'charge' that should be 'paid´ (Kompas, 2007; Rahardjo, 
2002; Tim Penyusun, 2005). 
The judiciary performance cannot be proud of and has not been regarded positively by the 
public. Prosecutors issue Warrant Termination of Investigation for cases (through "common 
sense") which is not really difficult to be categorized as an act of corruption that hurts the 
public's sense of justice. Not to mention, many legal cases handled by the judiciary are put down 
in court and declared the charges not proven and the defendant should be released from all 
claims (onslag van rechtsvervolging) just because of the letter and the charge content made by 
the judiciary have been formulated in such a way that from beginning have not been impartial 
aim and do not really favor the law and justice. 
The condition of judges and lawyers is also not much different from the reality in the ranks 
of police and prosecutors. Nets and snares of money, power intervention, lobby, case 
transactions and case brokers are everyday vocabularies as if they have been institutionalized 
that exceed their formal institutions themselves. Thus, in the ranks of the Supreme Court it is 
seen clearly how a legal case and concerning the corruption, circulates and is ‘circulated’ among 
the networks. In short, the condition of the police and prosecutors, judges, lawyers and the 
judicial system themselves, from the first level to the highest one, cannot eliminate a lot of 
mysterious things that perpetuate mistrust spaces. 
This condition is aggravated by the acts of some politicians and political institutions. The 
politicians and main institutions of democracy have been entangled in the mud and enjoyment 
of corruption. Directly supporting Regional Head Election (Election), the recruitment of 
candidates for state officials through a fit and proper test, specific discussion of the Legal Draft 
(Rancangan Undang Undang), even the recruitment of candidates for the internal legislative 
members of political party become an excellent opportunity to the flourishing of political 
transactions drawing no little amount of money. 
Do these conditions happen also in the recent years and until now? Unfortunately, the 
situation is not getting better. It is easy to find data telling us that those institutions are remaining 
almost the same. Anyone can search and prove easily by accessing daily news concerning the 
issue. The situation is getting worst. Since the Commission for Eradicating Corruption is 
infiltrated and trapped in proxy-war, it is decontaminated by negative opinion building through 
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parliamentary session and voices and marginalized, threatened, isolated by the act of internal 
splitting and external destruction (Republika, 2017); (Kompas, 2007). 
In short, the same thing happens with the law enforcement process, the political processes 
are hard to be considered running normally according to political market mechanism. The 
invisible hands in any recruitment of cadres, leaders, succession of central board are full of 
money politics. The recruitment and the political processes themselves have become gold mine 
and industry of very promising corruption. 
The Existence of the Judicial Commission and the Supreme Court: A Legal Framework 
The institutional existence of the Judicial Commission in the Indonesian constitutional legal 
system is contained in Chapter IX of the 1945 Constitution, the result of an amendment 
governing judicial power. Judicial Commission   is a new state institution that did not exist 
before the amendment. Article 24B of the 1945 Constitution states that: 
1. The Judicial Commission is independent and has the authority to propose the
appointment of justices and has other powers in maintaining and upholding honour,
dignity, and judicial behaviour.
2. Members of the Judicial Commission must have knowledge and experience in the legal
field and possessing impeccable integrity and personality.
3. Members of the Judicial Commission are appointed and dismissed by the President with
the approval of the House of Representatives.
4. The composition, position and membership of the Judicial Commission are regulated by
law.
Judicial Commission  provisions in Chapter IX which regulate judicial power does not mean 
that KY is an institution of judicial authority. Based on Article 24 paragraph (2) of the 1945 
Constitution the amendment results determined that the judicial authority is carried out by a 
Supreme Court and the judiciary below it in the general court, religious court, military court, 
state administration court, and by a constitutional court. 
Looking at the social settings that have been described previously, it can be said that the 
existence of Judicial Commission    is in order to support the creation of a truly independent 
judiciary, able to uphold law and justice, while answering the pessimism and mistrust of the 
public towards the independence of justice. If reflected in several countries, such as Australia, 
Italy, Spain and Portugal, institutions such as Judicial Commission   can play a constructive role 
in maintaining and enhancing the professionalism of judges and the judiciary (Kioukies, 2020). 
Thus, it can be stated that the existence of Judicial Commission    is motivated and functions 
as; first, the lack of intensive monitoring of judicial authority, because monitoring is only done 
internally; second, the absence of institutions that serve as a link between government power 
(executive power) and judicial power (judicial power); third, judicial power is considered 
inefficient in carrying out its duties if it is still preoccupied with technical non-legal issues; 
fourth, it often found that there is no consistency in judicial institutions' decisions, because each 
decision lacks the rigorous evaluation and supervision of a specialised institution; fifth, the 
pattern of recruitment of judges has so far been considered to be potentially politically 
contaminated, because the institutions that proposed and recruited it were political institutions, 
namely the president and parliament; Sixth, related to the honour and dignity of judges, it is not 
only interpreted as the need for monitoring and supervision, but can also be interpreted as 
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maintaining competence and professionalism. Here, it is deemed necessary to have an institution 
that can do that by providing training and programs that focus on fostering ethics and integrity 
and competence outside the judiciary itself. 
 The existence and function of Judicial Commission has become increasingly clear with the 
existence of Law (Law) Number 22 of 2004 which was later amended by Law Number 18 of 
2011 concerning Judicial Commission. Article 20 paragraph (1) of the Act confirms that: 
1. In order to maintain and uphold the honour, dignity, and behaviour of Judges, the
Judicial Commission has the task of:
a. monitoring and supervising the behaviour of Judges;
b. receiving reports from the public relating to violations of the Code of Ethics and /
or the Code of Conduct for Judges;
c. verifying, clarifying, and investigating reports of alleged violations of the Code of
Ethics and / or Judges' Code of Conduct in private;
d. deciding whether or not a report of alleged violation of the Code of Ethics and / or
the Judge's Code of Conduct is true and;
e. taking legal steps and / or other steps against individuals, groups of people, or legal
entities that humiliate the honour and dignity of the Judge.
The existence of the Supreme Court is as old as the existence of Indonesia. The Supreme 
Court in the history of the constitutional journey of the Republic of Indonesia (RI) is one of the 
state institutions that has always existed and is regulated in constitutions that have been in force 
in Indonesia starting from the 1945 Constitution which was ratified on 18 August 1945 
(including the 1945 Constitution after the Decree of 5 July 1959), the Constitution of the United 
States of Indonesia (KRIS) 1949, the Provisional Constitution (UUDS) of 1950 and the 1945 
Constitution of Amendment Results. In the amendment of the 1945 Constitution, the existence 
of the Supreme Court is regulated in Article 24 paragraph (2) and Article 24 A, including Article 
14 paragraph (1) which regulates granting clemency and rehabilitation from the President. 
Article 24 paragraph (2) of the amendment of the 1945 Constitution states expressly that, 
“Judicial power is exercised by a Supreme Court and the judiciary below it within the general 
court, religious court, military court, state administration court,. .. " Whereas Article 24A of the 
1945 amendment stipulates that: 
1. The Supreme Court has the authority to adjudicate at the cessation level, examine the
statutory provisions under the law against the law, and have other powers granted by
law.
2. The Supreme Court Justices must have integrity and personality that are impeccable,
fair, professional and experienced in law.
3. Prospective Supreme Court Judges are proposed by the Judicial Commission to the
House of Representatives to get approval and subsequently be appointed as Chief Justice
by the President.
4. The chair and deputy chair of the Supreme Court are chosen from and by the Supreme
Court judge.
5. The composition, position, membership and procedural law of the Supreme Court and
the judiciary below are regulated by law.
Regarding judicial authority itself, the 1945 Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia (1945 
Constitution) because of the amendment confirms "Judicial power is the power of an 
independent state to administer justice to enforce law and justice". In Law No. 48 of 2009 
concerning Judicial Power also states that, 
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“Judicial Power is the power of an independent state to administer justice in order to enforce 
law and justice based on the Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution of the Republic of 
Indonesia, for the sake of implementing the Republic of Indonesia's Law State.” 
The Supreme Court as one of the highest judicial powers of the state has a strategic position 
and role in judicial power because it oversees not only 4 (four) judicial environments but also 
management in the administrative, personnel and financial fields and facilities and 
infrastructure. The “one roof” policy provides responsibilities and challenges because the 
Supreme Court is demanded to show its ability to create professional, effective, transparent and 
accountable institutional organisations. For this matter, the Supreme Court has an internal 
control authority attached to the level and structure and functional internal controls within the 
Supreme Court Supervisory Agency. The responsibilities of the Supreme Court are contained 
in Law No. 35 of 1999 concerning Amendment to Law No. 14 of 1970 on the Basic Provisions 
of Judicial Power, and has been revised by Law No. 4 of 2004, and being revised through Law 
No. 48 of 2009 concerning Judicial Power. 
Daily Behavior and Cultural Paradox: Law and Episodes of  Drama 
Disharmony took place between the Supreme Court and the Judicial Commission in carrying 
out its supervisory duties and functions beginning in 2005, when the Judicial Commission took 
action in order to supervise the judges of the West Java High Court, after Depok regional 
election case. The judges annulled Nurmahmudi Ismail's victory as the mayor of Depok. Judicial 
Commission  sent a recommendation to the Supreme Court to fire the head of the panel of judges 
(who is also the chairperson of PT of West Java) and gave a written warning. However, the 
Supreme Court did not immediately follow up the Judicial Commission recommendations, if 
Judicial Commission threatened to send a reprimand to the Supreme Court.  
In the same year, Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, Bagir Manan, refused to fulfil the 
Judicial Commission summons related to the alleged bribery case by Probosutedjo with 
Arthaloka land dispute. Conditions became even more heated when KY proposed the idea of a 
re-selection of justices. The Judicial Commission, accompanied by Minister of Justice and 
Human Rights Hamid Awaluddin, met with President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono to discuss 
the re-selection. They advised the president to issue an alternative regulation (Peraturan 
Pemerintah Pengganti Undang-undang/Perppu) as a legal basis. However, the Perppu that they 
requested in the end was never published. 
Prolonged chaos never subsided. The media reported 13 (thirteen) Supreme Court Justices 
that were considered to be problematic based on information of Judicial Commission. The news 
sparked the anger of the Supreme Court. The judges who were named revealed reported Judicial 
Commission (Detik, 2005a; Merdeka, 2005; Detik, 2005b; Suaramerdeka, 2005; Detik, 2006; 
Hukumonline, 2006) Chief Busyro Muqodas to the Police on charges of defamation. The dispute 
continued when 40 justices in March 2006 filed a petition for judicial review of Law No. 22 of 
2004 concerning the Judicial Commission to the Constitutional Court.  
For the judges, Article 4 B of the 1945 Constitution is not intended for Supreme Court 
Justices and Constitutional Justices. The provisions in the Judicial Commission Act and the 
Judicial Power Law which regulates that the Judicial Commission has the authority to supervise 
Supreme Court Justices and Constitutional Justices is seen as contradictory to Article 24 B (1) 
of the 1945 Constitution. The Constitutional Court granted some of the petition's claims. 
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However, according to the Court, justices are included in judges who are monitored by Judicial 
Commission. 
In 2010, Judicial Commission attempted to examine 7 (seven) Supreme Court Justices who 
were considered to have violated the code of ethics and the code of conduct of judges. However, 
the judges refused to attend the hearing. They are Paulus Effendy Lotulung, Djoko Sarwoko, 
Ahmad Sukarja, I Made Tara, Mansur Kartayasa, Hakim Nyak Pha, and Imam Soebechi. In 
2012, the conflict declined slightly, even considered the best period in the history of the Supreme 
Court and Judicial Commission relations. The proof four joint regulations were successfully 
agreed upon and signed. This is inseparable from the role of the liaison team formed by the two 
institutions. The team is tasked with discussing and accommodating all issues that should be 
discussed between the two institutions. 
Then Supreme Court - Judicial Commission relations heated up again in 2015. In January 
2015, public attention was focused on the Supreme Court Judge Timur Manurung who was 
questioned by the Corruption Eradication Commission related to a case of alleged bribery in the 
recommendation of exchanging forest areas in Bogor. He was examined as a witness. He was 
also reportedly having dinner with a corruption defendant and a lawyer at a restaurant on Jalan 
Sudirman, Jakarta. The Chief Justice did not want to comment on the case. However, Judicial 
Commission has formed an investigation team. Timur also threatened to report Judicial 
Commission commissioners to the Police (Kompas, 2015; Detik, 2015).  
February 2016, Judicial Commission and Supreme Court were also involved in differences 
of opinion with Sarpin Rizaldi, a judge at the South Jakarta District Court, who accepted General 
Budi Gunawan's pre-trial lawsuit. Judge Sarpin expanded the pre-trial object where the 
determination of the suspect could be used as a pre-trial object. The verdic seized public 
attention. Judicial Commission criticized and planned to examine Judge Sarpin for allegedly 
violating the code of ethics and good behaviour of judges (Kode Etik dan Pedoman Perilaku 
Hakim/KEPPH) while the Supreme Court insisted it would not examine Sarpin. In March 2015, 
the Supreme Court Justices who were members of the Indonesian Judges Association submitted 
a judicial review of the Judicial Commission.  
They questioned the rules that gave the Judicial Commission authority to be involved in the 
selection of appointing judges with the Supreme Court in three judicial environments through 
judicial review to the Constitutional Court. The Indonesian Judges Association (IKAHI) 
requests the review of Article 14A paragraph (2), (3) of Law no. 49 of 2009 concerning General 
Judiciary, Article 13A paragraph (2), (3) of the Law No. 50 of 2009 concerning Religious Courts 
and Article 14A paragraph (2), (3) of Law no. 51 of 2009 concerning State Administrative Court 
(PTUN). According to IKAHI, the authority of the Judicial Commission in the selection process 
for selecting judges degrades the role of IKAHI to maintain the independence guaranteed by 
Article 24 of the 1945 Constitution. In addition, Article 21 of the Judicial Power Law states that 
the organisation, administration, and finance of the Supreme Court and the judiciary are under 
the authority of the Supreme Court. The IKAHI step has come under fire from many parties. A 
few months before IKAHI submitted this judicial review, the Supreme Court and the Judicial 
Commission had agreed to the draft MA-KY Joint Regulation on the Selection of Appointment 
of Judges, only to be signed by the Supreme Court. 
Then there was another conflict related to the Supreme Court's refusal of the 
recommendation submitted by Judicial Commission to the Chief Justice regarding the Antasari 
Azhar case, which requested that the panel of judges of the Antasari Azhar case be prohibited 
from handling cases for 6 months alias “non-hammer judges.” The decision was taken at the 
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Supreme Court's plenary meeting (cnnindonesia, 2015); (Hukumonline, n.d.). 17 In this case 
even before, Judicial Commission planned to submit a Dispute Authority between State 
Institutions (Sengketa Kewenangan Lembaga Negara /SKLN) to the Court to request an 
assessment of whether the Supreme Court leadership meeting had the right to refuse a decision 
on Judicial Commission recommendations since the meeting was not the trial panel of judges, 
but a part of leadership of the Supreme Court which was merely administrative. 
However, besides the conflict between the two institutions in the supervision of judges, the 
Indonesian Supreme Court and the Indonesian Judicial Commission have also established 
cooperation in supervising judges in Indonesia. First, the ratification of Law No. 48 of 2009 
concerning Judicial Power, Law No. 3 of 2009 concerning the Second Amendment to Law No, 
14 of 1985 concerning the Supreme Court and a number of changes to the laws and regulations 
of all judicial bodies under the Supreme Court, as well as the drafting of a Joint Decree on the 
Code of Ethics and the Code of Conduct for Judges. Secondly, the ratification of Law No. 18 of 
2011 concerning Amendments to Law No. 22 of 2004 concerning the Judicial Commission; and 
third, four joint regulations emerged with the Supreme Court and the Judicial Commission of 
the Republic of Indonesia No. 01/PB/MA/IX/2012-01/PB/P.KY/09/2012 Regarding the 
Appointment of Judges, No. 02/PB/MA/IX/2012-02/PB/P.KY/09/2012 Regarding Guidelines 
for Enforcing the Code of Ethics and the Code of Conduct for Judges, No. 03/PB/MA/IX/2012-
03/PB/P.KY/09/2012 Regarding the Procedures for Joint Examination, No. 04/PB/MA/IX/ 
2012-04/PB/P.KY/09/2012 Regarding Formation, Work Procedures and Procedures for 
Decision Making of Honorary Judges.  
Cultural-Based Perspectives on Law: Offering Solutions 
Learning from the history and difficulties of the relationship between Judicial Commission 
and Supreme Court above, some notes deserve to be underlined. First, strengthening the 
determination to practise law based on the vision and mission of the nation amid the challenges 
of changing times and freeing oneself from the dogmatic legal tradition of Begriffsjurisprudenz. 
Begriffsjurisprudenz's legal tradition teaches that the main points of law, legal reasoning and 
application of law are developed from existing concepts through merely a logical approach, to 
give a strong impression of the power of the law to carry out an expansion of logic itself amid 
social reality. In such a perspective, every act of deduction and application of a law that is most 
important to note is the integration of positivist and logical coherence of interpretations only 
(Erzeugungszusammenhang). In short, the law is revoked from the ethical goals and macro-
morality-socio-economic-national-purpose setting in the name of logic and positivist coherence 
of the law itself. In fact, even progressive methods and legislation, but in the hands of law 
enforcers who lack integrity and comprehensive skills, will continue to create sustainable social 
and legal anomalies. The legal method is not in a space. It depends on who will be behind the 
method itself (the man behind the gun). In this context, it is actual if Taverne (Dutch legal 
expert) states: Geef me goede Rechters, goede Officieren van Justitie, goede Rechter 
Commisarissen en goede a good judge, a good prosecutor, a good commissioner judge and a 
good police officer, so I will make bad criminal procedural law become good). All parties 
deserve to be careful of the entrapment of Begriffsjurisprudenz's dogmatic thinking, or efforts 
to look for logical protection in the approach's mechanism. Since behind it all, the reality that 
occurs can actually show the creation of complicated legal bureaucratization, like no end. As a 
98  | 
Buletin Al-Turas Vol. 27 No. 1   January 2021, pp. 89-104 
result, it can be increasingly distanced the lives of the nation from ideals (Asunka & Afulani, 
2018). 
Second, Judicial Commission and Supreme Court as far as possible eliminate the shadows 
of the past and cooperate closely in a shared vision and mission and avoid the legal 
argumentation model that leads to; a) argumentum ad hominem, an argument based solely on 
considerations for attacking people / institutions directly and relying solely on interests and 
feelings of antipathy; b) argumentum ad ignorantiam, arguments that are based on assumptions 
that are not easily proven wrong, or also assumptions that are not easily proven true, c) 
argumentum ad populum, an error of argument because it is only concerned with public opinion 
and its internal collegial imagery or communal spirit. 
Third, it must be understood by Judicial Commission, the imperative mandate of the law 
states that internally, that Judicial Commission must limit itself (self-censorship) not to be in 
the zone of supervision and correction of technical-judicial matters, such as providing comments 
on trials or decisions who have not had permanent legal force, and understand the principles and 
juridical commitments of supervision as mandated by the law. This means Judicial Commission 
is focused on monitoring things outside the course of the trial, namely the ethics and behaviour 
of judges. Analysis of decisions is permitted on certain terms and conditions. 
Fourth, all parties should be convinced again that the existence of Judicial Commission will 
not disrupt the independence of judges in deciding cases (Fischer-Lescano, 2016; Salles & Cruz, 
2020). But precisely strengthen it. This was realized by Judicial Commission's commitment with 
the Supreme Court to maintain the independence of judges and the judiciary with the following 
patterns and guidelines: 
1) Independent judicial power is the power in conducting judicial or judicial functions
which includes the power to examine and decide on a case.
2) Independent judicial power is intended to guarantee the freedom of judges from various
worries or fears caused by a decision or legal decision made.
3) Independent judicial power guarantees judges to act objectively, honestly and
impartially.
4) Supervision of judicial power is solely carried out through ordinary or extraordinary
legal efforts by and within the environment of the judicial authority itself. Within certain
limits, it can be done by external authorities with strict rules outlined by legislation with
a focus on the ethics and behaviour of judges.
5) Independent judicial authority forbids all forms of direct interference from outside the
judiciary that are not stipulated by applicable law.
6) All actions against judges are carried out purely according to law.
Fifth, Judicial Commission outlines in a more straightforward manner that external 
supervision is oversight carried out by institutions outside the Supreme Court on the behaviour 
of Judges. The judge's behaviour is monitored when carrying out his duties (official) and in his 
daily behaviour. External supervision by Judicial Commission is carried out to strengthen 
internal supervision by the Supreme Court, which has been existing so far. This is under Law 
No. 48 of 2009 concerning Judicial Power, Law on the Supreme Court, statutory regulations 
related to the four jurisdictions of the judiciary under the Supreme Court, and Law on Judicial 
Commissions. Implementation of the supervision of judges externally by Judicial Commission 
carried out in three ways; 
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a. Through the receipt of public reports related to violations of the Code of Ethics (KE) and
the Code of Judges Conduct (PPH). Article 22 paragraph (1) of Law No. 18 of 2011
states that in carrying out supervision, Judicial Commission receives community reports
and / or information about violations of the KE and PPH. Handling community reports
is a series of activities ranging from reception, deepening, panel discussion sessions
(results of deepening), examinations (reporters, expert witnesses, or reported parties),
and clarification of reported parties, inspection panel sessions (results of examining
reporters, witnesses and / or experts), and plenary session (the results of the examination
and / or clarification of the reported), and implementing the results of the session;
b. Research on court decisions that have permanent legal force. Besides receiving report
from the public, Judicial Commission has the authority to supervise judges through
examination of court decisions that have permanent legal force. This is not to correct or
revising decisions. However, the decision analysis aims to determine the tendency of
decisions of appellate court and first court judges in terms of observance of procedural
law, mastery of material law, legal reasoning, and the exploration of living values in
society, and describing the professionalism of judges in case resolution. In addition, the
analysis of decisions that have permanent legal force is also intended for the compilation
and collection of databases, both individually and collectively about appellate court
judges who are worthy and potentially as Supreme Court Justices (career paths) and first
court judges one day can fill the position of supreme judge. The results can be the basis
for increasing the capacity of judges, and recommendations for mutations (promotion
and demotion). Judicial Commission must not state judicial and substantive
considerations. It is also not justified to state that decisions made by Judges are true or
false, regardless of the good behaviour of the supervised Judge. Thus, the focus of
Judicial Commission research is to recapitalise data, track records and strengthening
meritocracy processes based on transparency, accountability and professionalism under
the limits of Judicial Commission's authority;
c. Monitoring at court.  It is possible for the involvement of elements of society. In this
monitoring activity, Judicial Commission can establish cooperation with other agencies,
Judicial Commission networks, and/or other parties. Trial monitoring at all levels of the
judiciary can be carried out if there is a request for monitoring from the community or
on Judicial Commission's own initiative. The object of monitoring is the trial process,
the judge's behaviour, and the situation and condition of the court. The results of
monitoring at the hearing will be submitted to the Supreme Court and the chair of the
court monitored as an evaluation so that the same violation does not occur again, or at
least can be minimized.
Sixth, in a constructive and corrective way, Judicial Commission continues to strengthen its 
commitment to maintain the honour, dignity and behaviour of judges. Constructively this can 
be realized by (for example) Judicial Commission should not stay silent in the matter of fighting 
for the fate and welfare of judges in budgeting. Judicial Commission should actively take part 
and stand in the forefront in preventing events that lead to humiliation of the judiciary and judges 
(contempt of court) and strive for programs that lead to maintaining the internalisation of the 
ethical and professional commitment of the judiciary in a preventive manner for the realisation 
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of an authoritative judicial power. Corrective means to carry out the critical and independent 
oversight functions, as explained above. 
Seventh, strengthening visionary institutional partnerships. When viewed from the 
organisational rules and institutional governance, Judicial Commission is the Supreme Court's 
external supervisory agency. Within the Supreme Court organisation itself there is a Supervisory 
Agency that functions to carry out functional oversight and the structure of the leadership of the 
Supreme Court which also carries out inherent supervision. This means the Supreme Court itself 
carries out an internal oversight function (J. Priban, 2017). As is also known that the position of 
Judicial Commission and MA in the state institutional system is equal. So, even though Judicial 
Commission has supervisory authority, it does not mean that supervision can be implemented 
with a vertical pattern (top-down supervision), but relies on the partnership and alignment 
supervision model (horizontal pattern). In this alignment model, the principal thing that Judicial 
Commission must build is the principle of critical collaboration in supervision. The principle of 
critical collaboration requires the independence of Judicial Commission supervision rights, but 
still shows an open partnership attitude to the Supreme Court. This means that the data available 
and generated from the MA's internal supervision, are both the data from the results of 
embedded supervision and functional supervision that have been carried out, as long as they are 
considered relevant to the external supervision function, cannot be ignored by Judicial 
Commission. Conversely, the Supreme Court still must respect the right of Judicial Commission 
to carry out its external oversight functions. With the Joint Agreement Letter (SKB) that has 
been agreed by both parties and the existing line of institutional authority, Judicial Commission 
supervision will actually maintain the integrity of honour, dignity and behaviour of judges, by 
providing an overview and supervision of the comparison of what has been produced by the 
Supreme Court. Supervision that is produced through a two-layer technique (internal 
supervision from the Supreme Court itself and external from the Judicial Commission) will have 
a dimension of objectivity and impartiality, rather than only being done through one layer. Even 
in the justice system there are several layers of legal remedies in the same material. The same is 
true in other professional world, such as in medical laboratory tests, which are often done several 
times for the same cases and samples. The joint decree between Judicial Commission and 
Supreme Court has actually led to this goal. However, there must still be a follow up and 
strengthening effort. 
Eighth, strengthening Pancasila as a source of ethics and maximising togetherness resolution 
through non-legal factors by strengthening management capacity, leadership and Judicial 
Commission's ethical mission for community engagement and strengthening public trust. Law 
enforcement is not only related to juridical aspects. The task of Judicial Commission is more to 
the supervision and strengthening of ethical aspects. Here, matters relating to communication 
management, leadership, and the ethical commitment of Judicial Commission and all 
stakeholders absolutely need attention. Sometimes, Judicial Commission has to talk more in a 
focused / closed room since aspects of supervision cannot all be completely open and published 
in such a way. Sometimes Judicial Commission still had to focus on carrying out its supervisory 
functions in private. But, at the right time, if the evidence and process has become real and clear, 
then Judicial Commission can fulfil its public accountability task by opening wider information 
and partnerships with elements of the community. In short, as a state institution that carries out 
ethical functions, Judicial Commission is in the spotlight and high hopes to be able as a partner 
of the Supreme Court and all other stakeholders based on the state philosophy of Pancasila; 
reflecting the ethics of divinity, humanity, upholding unity, democracy and justice. 
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Ninth, one of the 'failure' of Judicial Commission is a non-empirical legal readings and 
horizontal and vertical communication techniques that are insensitive and down to earth. Then 
KY needs to be aware of the lattice and tips of applied legal communication management 
(Kioukies, 2020); (J. Asunka & Patience A. A., 2018). The management relies on questions: 
Say what? (What message is delivered to partners?); In which channel? (What media are used?); 
To whom? (Who is the listener?); With what effect? (What effects are expected?); When (when? 
How (How to do it?); Why (Why is this done?). These questions in the legal communication 
management strategy are very important, because the approach to the expected effects of an 
ethics monitoring and enforcement activity can be of various types, namely: disseminating 
information, carrying out persuasion; carry out instructions; give early warning; invite joint 
commitment; start a new phase of collaboration; push for sanctions, etc. Calling the Chief 
Justice of the Supreme Court in the initial clarification process for an ethical oversight is not an 
effective oversight measure (Fischer-Lescano, 2016). 
Tenth, communication techniques and other tips that can strengthen and are worthy to be put 
forward also are, smoothing communication using the approach A. A. Procedure or From 
Attention to Action Procedure abbreviated as AIDDA. The details are: A. Attention, I. Interest, 
D. Desire, D. Decision, Action. Its meaning are:
a. The phasing process starts with attention. Here, measurably, in supervising judges and
ethical enforcement, Judicial Commission must be able to generate source attractiveness,
and messages of urgency and proportionality in the agenda's implementation.
b. KY strives to continue to invite and create common ground or equalize the vision and
mission of the Supreme Court, thus creating a commitment of togetherness.
c. In arousing attention, avoid the emergence of negative and repressive appeals, thereby
fostering anxiety, worry and fear about the loss of the independence of the judicial
power.
d. If attention has been raised, and togetherness strengthens, it should be followed by
efforts to foster interest (interest) which is a higher degree of attention.
e. Interest is a continuation of attention, which is the starting point for the emergence of
the desire (desire) to carry out an expected activity.
f. Desire alone means nothing, because it must be followed by a decision (decision),
namely the decision to carry out activities (action) as expected; proportional, procedural
and professional Judicial Commission and Supreme Court constructive-critical
cooperation.
CONCLUSION 
Law enforcement is not only introducing and copying receipt of law and establishing legal 
institution. It is breaking cultural regression and advancing rational approach. Weber states 
within a rational substance of law, there must be a rational procedure. Irrational procedures 
could hamper the process of law enforcement. Behind irrational procedures, one can find 
cultural roots. Thus, law is applied by human agency. To be effective, its cultural root should 
be reconstructed. The disharmony of communication and partnership between the Judicial 
Commission and the Supreme Court can not be resolved unless its cultural roots are invented 
and disclosed. The culture of corruption, ignorance of public trust, and institutional ego-centrism 
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reject ethics of professionalism, transparency and mutual trust. These roots make the Indonesian 
legal culture runs slowly towards a real reformation.          
Judicial Commission needs a breakthrough of law enforcement. It does not depend only on 
pure legal approach. It is based on the reform mission, as it was introduced in 1999. Historically, 
the existence of Judicial Commission is strong to carry out ‘sacred mission’. It can’t be 
downgraded by conservative understanding of law. Judicial Commission should extend and 
execute the mission by forming a grand strategy which integrates law enforcement and cultural 
strategy penetration. Legal paradox occurs because of the conservation of legal impunity. 
Supreme Court conserves itself to be the guardian of positivism. Thus, Judicial Commission 
should transform legal culture towards progressive approach (Cotterrell, 2017b).  
Judicial Commission is not only a legal institution, but it is also an organization of reform. 
In order to match the target, Judicial Commission may build cooperation to other civil 
organizations and launch a new approach of creative communication skills of reform movement 
based on the theories of attention, intention, desire, decision and action (J. Asunka & Patience 
A. A., 2018).
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